MUNSCM - Abandoned

[EnPaceRequiescat]

i'll

vote: in favor

[cuban smoker]

Delegate from Brazil, your vote is out of order, regardless of what you were voting for.

[cuban smoker]

Okay... I'm going to ask the delegate from Spain to step down, and call on the first speaker on the speaker's list... nobody!

I will entertain many types of motions, and I will also allow anyone who wishes to speak to do so immediately.

[massive]

The delegate from the Phillipines requests to be added to the Speaker's List, and as the Speaker's List is empty, hopes that it is in order that he immediately takes the podium.

I would like to say that I am quite unsure what this proposal is trying to do. The two portions of the proposal seem to be trying to short-circuit things that the Security Council could do by itself given the situations presented.

Section one requires that when a future proposal instructs a Weapons Inspection in a country with a veto, that that country has his power of veto removed. The rules of the Security Council already remove this power: a country CANNOT veto a proposal that names them and only them by name. So this portion of the proposal seems to do nothing.

Section two requires that a country cannot veto a proposition when they are the only country remaining to vote. While I can understand the function of this section when presented in good faith, it effectively terminates a permanent member's veto ability based solely on the time they decide (or are able) to vote. What should happen if one of our permanent members receives information of innocence about a country, but cannot veto the resolution to destroy it before the last vote? (I understand that, arguably, the country being destroyed would vote no and negate this clause, but this is the best example I can come up with that displays the possible problems with this clause.) If the council feels that a proposition was unnecessarily veto'ed, they can move to remove the vetoing power and again discuss the proposition, this time without the threat of immediate veto looming.

On the contrary, I believe that this proposition instead removes the chances for the evil among us to slip up. Without the ability to veto things that immediately impact their Axis compatriots, the probable Permanent council member in the Axis is less able to impact this session, and thus less likely to make the errors that will best help us to find and eliminate them.

[Uraj45]

POIS To the speaker:

Have you noticed that the resolution says countries voting for the amendment and not on the amendment at that this means that it has only to do with the amount of support for the amendment and not the time that a country votes?
Do you not realize that the ability to veto the destruction of a nation has already been negated and do you feel that a nation should reveal their inspector information if it is the only way to prevent it's destruction?

POI To the chair:

Could you possibly clarify for myself and for others what exactly this resolution would do if passed? I wish to make sure that it would have the effect that was intended.

[Vraak X]

Point of Information to the Speaker:

If in the scenario that a country receives innocent information about another country that is being targetted for a nuclear strike sanctioned by the United Nations, does the delegate from the Phillipines not realize that if another country realizes this innocence, then the second clause is automatically negated, because it renders the power of veto effective when two or more countries are dissenting? Does the delegate from the Phillipines realize that the clause prevents use of veto power when a clear majority (all but one of the countries with veto powers) has been reached on a resolution, and because MUNSCM 009 prevents use of veto powers on any nuclear strike, this passage does not apply to nuclear strikes? Also, has the delegate from the Phillipines read the passage in its entirety, in regards to the passage where the veto prevention in the first paragraph REAFFIRMS, not REQUIRES?

[Flying Dutchman]

Point of Information to the Speaker:

As the accused would vote against almost certainly if this means his own death, is there even a theoretical situation imaginable where the second clause would come to effect?

[cuban smoker]

Delegate from the Phillipines, your speech is very much in order.

Delegate from Spain, operative clause 1 will nullify the power of veto in any resolution that calls for the depolyment of inspectors in a nation with veto power. Operative clause 2 will nullify the power of veto an ALL resolutions if every other living member of the SC votes in favour. Note that the original rules have provisions very similar to this.

[the silent speaker]

Point of Information to the Chair:

If this resolution passes, could, say, France veto a resolution on sending inspectors to Russia, or is the revocation of veto power limited to the country whose inspection is under question?

[cuban smoker]

Delegate from Benin, as the resolution currently stands, France could veto a resolution that calls for inspectors in Russia. Operative clause 1 is specific enough that is specifies whose veto power is being revoked. I realize this is slightly different than my previous answer, so I apologize for the confusion.

[the silent speaker]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Point of Information directed at the Speaker:

Granting that the first clause does nothing, what harm does it do? And assuming that there is none, what harm is there in allowing a useless operative clause to "piggyback" on a resolution? i.e. assuming that consensus is reached regarding the second clause, would you still object to the resolution on grounds related to its first clause, and if so, why?

[massive]

To the esteemed gentleman from Spain: I realize that the second portion of MUNSCM 010 has EVERYTHING to do with timing, although that was not your point. MUNSCM 010 basically says that if you want to veto something, you had best do it before everyone else votes, or your veto has no effect. I think the emphasis has been placed on what this does in terms of giant, game-affecting resolutions and not what this does to the smaller, less-impacting resolutions.

I do realize that the ability to veto nuclear strikes has been removed. I believe the council has already agreed that whoever receives the inspectors' report should reveal that information immediately; as I stated, it was a bad example but the only one I could think of that adequately described how my country felt about the proposition.

To the esteemed gentleman from the United States: Please bear with me, as English is not the native language of my country, and your use of negatives and double-negatives has left me somewhat confused.

For most of your statement, please remember that I have said (and will say again) that the example was a poor one. The Phillipines feels that there are many implications that are being overlooked, but these are arguably minor, and so the example was given to try and impress some urgency about the other side of the proposal. It is obvious that there are issues with the example, as I stated in my opening comments.

In reference to the first clause, of course we have read and understood the language of the first clause. My initial comments were constructed to remind the council that, by and large, the first clause is unnecessary and should not be considered as a reason to keep this proposal.

To the esteemed gentleman from China: I agree that this is probable, but not absolute, and said so in my initial comments.

To the esteemed gentleman from Benin: The first clause of MUNSCM 010 is not harmful in and of itself. My initial comments were to remind the council that it, in effect, does nothing, and should not be considered as a qualifier in their votes for this proposal.

As such, I am of course willing to take my own advice, and will not vote yes or no based on the first clause of this proposal.

[massive]

The delegate from the Phillipines will be taking a short sabbatical over the weekend, and thus steps down from the podium. If there is demand for my return, I will resume my spot on the speaker's list once I return.

[Vraak X]

Mr. Chairman, the United States hereby motions for a roll-call to determine the activity of the delegates. Some of them seem to be rather.. motionless..

[Narninian]

I second. This would give us a good oppurtunity to see active participants.

[the silent speaker]

*moves*

[Uraj45]

It seems that this resolution is simply not generating interest, not that people are inactive.
As such

Spain motions to close debate

[dragonmaster]

If possible, Russia seconds that motion.

[Vraak X]

I do believe that two motions cannot be in order at the same time.

[Uraj45]

I do believe that there is no such thing as a motion to role-call.

[NanookTheWolf]

I agree.

[the silent speaker]

I wonder if that person in the corner blibbering over the collapse of protocol is the Chairman.

[Vraak X]

I do believe that such a motion can be attended to, Delegate from Spain.

[Vraak X]

Point of Information to the Chair:

In support of my motion, I would like to turn the Security Council to Article VI of Robert's Rules of Order, Section 41, under the title "Call of the House," in which the assembly is called upon and convinced to attend the session. My point of information the Chair is, is this considered legal justification for a motion to take attendance? Any absentees, assuredly, must immediately return to Council chambers.

I point you to the specific reference in the Call of the House section:

Rule. When no quorum is present, if one-fifth of the members elect are present, they may by a majority vote order a call of the house and compel the attendance of absent members. After the call is ordered, a motion to adjourn, or to dispense with further proceedings in the call, cannot be entertained until a quorum is present, or until the sergeant-at-arms2 reports that in his opinion no quorum can be obtained on that day.

If no quorum is present, a call of the house takes precedence of everything, even reading the minutes, except the motion to adjourn, and only requires in its favor the number specified in the rule. If a quorum is present a call should rank with questions of privilege [19], requiring a majority vote for its adoption, and if rejected it should not be renewed while a quorum is present at that meeting. After a call is ordered, until further proceedings in the call are dispensed with, no motion is in order except to adjourn and a motion relating to the call, so that a recess could not be taken by unanimous consent. An adjournment puts an end to all proceedings in the call, except that the assembly before adjournment, if a quorum is present, can order such members as are already arrested to make their excuse at an adjourned meeting.

[shadyforce]

Well, I'd like to

vote in favour

of the motion for roll-call. Also, I'd like to apologise for not being present for the last page or 2. I've been distracted with a lot of stuff happening at once elsewhere. I'll read up and post my opinions and stuff.

~Chile.